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Abstract—Today’s smartphones are equipped with a large
number of powerful value-added sensors and features such
as a low power Bluetooth sensor, powerful embedded sensors
such as the digital compass, accelerometer, GPS sensors, Wi-
Fi capabilities, microphone, humidity sensors, health tracking
sensors, and a camera, etc. These value-added sensors have
revolutionized the lives of the human being in many ways such,
as tracking the health of the patients and movement of doctors,
tracking employees movement in large manufacturing units, and
monitoring the environment, etc. These embedded sensors could
also be used for large-scale personal, group, and community sens-
ing applications especially tracing the spread of certain diseases.
Governments and regulators are turning to use these features to
trace the people thought to have symptoms of certain diseases or
virus e.g. COVID-19. The outbreak of COVID-19 in December
2019, has seen a surge of the mobile applications for tracing,
tracking and isolating the persons showing COVID-19 symptoms
to limit the spread of disease to the larger community. The use of
embedded sensors could disclose private information of the users
thus potentially bring threat to the privacy and security of users.
In this paper, we analyzed a large set of smartphone applications
that have been designed to contain the spread of the COVID-19
virus and bring the people back to normal life. Specifically, we
have analyzed what type of permission these smartphone apps
require, whether these permissions are necessary for the track
and trace, how data from the user devices is transported to the
analytic center, and analyzing the security measures these apps




It is believed that a virus that causes the novel COVID-
19 disease spreads mainly from having a close interaction
or contact with the person already being affected with the
virus, and still carrying the attributes of the virus. Since
December 2019, work has already begun on the development
of a potential vaccine for the cure, however, until the de-
velopment of vaccines for masses, the only possible way of
protection is to limit the interaction with the people, isolate
the people through imposing full or smart lock-down. The
efficient smart lockdown could be imposed by employing the
track and trace method that only isolates the infected people
and their contacts. For this purpose, several smartphone apps
for android, iOS, and Windows operating systems have been
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developed for tracing, tracking, and informing citizens about
whether they have recently come in close contact with the
person showing confirmed attributes of COVID-19. These apps
can be either private or government-owned.
The Contact tracing operates by identifying positive cases of
COVID-19 and asking them for their close contacts manually
or identifying their close contacts in an automated way. Figure
1 presents the building block and working mechanism of the
contact tracing apps [1]. The contact-tracing apps exchange
information when the phones of two persons are close enough
to each other. These people who came socially close to one
another will be informed if their counterparts during the social
interaction were officially infected with the COVID-19. These
apps can only serve as the anchor point to inform citizens and
provide suggestions on whether they should go to isolation or
not. These apps have already shown efficiency in controlling
the spread of the virus in South Korea and Singapore and
flatten the spread curve through ”Test” and then “Trace”
mechanism [2], [3].
The contact-tracing apps are broadly developed by the
national or country lead health regulators. To provide a reliable
and efficient decision, the developed apps utilize the informa-
tion from various smartphone sensors (GPS, Bluetooth) along
with names, addresses, gender, age, contact details, calling
log history, and contact history, etc. to make the decision.
These apps either interact automatically with the national
health data system for the test results of the citizens or citizens
could manually provide test results to the health organization.
For instance, upon downloading, Pakistan’s track & trace
app 1 requests permission to use the device’s location and
user personal details such as name, phone number, and email
address, and that stored data will be shared with a third party.
The current version of this app (as of June-2020) then uses
the device’s location and the location of users with positive
COVID-19 test results to render a map showing high-level
hotspots for COVID-19 infections. Similarly, Google and Ap-
ple jointly developed an API that enables app developers to use
the Bluetooth beacon messages for exchanging information
between two persons who are in close contact with each
other and showing virus symptoms. Some countries use the
call detailed records to trace the close contact of the infected
person and isolate them as well.
The use of these apps is normally voluntary and is con-
sidered as the support to control the spread of the virus.
The developed app requests users for specific permission e.g.
contact details, call history, web searches, camera permissions,
1https://tinyurl.com/y4lt634d
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Fig. 1: Tracing and Isolating through Smartphone based Contact-tracing [1]
access to call records, messages, and mobile media (videos
and photos). This information could pose serious privacy
and security risks to the users and limit users to use these
apps. The privacy of users may be protected through the use
of different mechanism e.g. data anonymization, differential
privacy, and decentralized app development [4]. However, it
is already identified that anonymization systems are not pro-
viding effective privacy-preservation [5]–[7] and decentralized
app development is still at the early stage and progressing very
slowly.
In this paper, we provide a first look at the permission,
security, and privacy analysis of the contact tracing apps
available at the Android and iOS app stores. We have studied
app stores to define the nature of the privacy risks these apps
have, what types of permissions these apps are requesting
for their functioning, which permissions are unnecessarily
required, and how they store and process the user data.
Currently, only a small number of certified apps (developed
by the country regulator) are available at the play stores, so
we performed an exhaustive manual analysis on the available
apps. Our analysis shows that the majority of the track and
trace apps collect personal information such as name, device
ID, and location, however, some apps require access to further
resources such as SMS, microphone, camera, and storage
memory of the device. Access to such resources is not required
for the accurate function of such apps, and, therefore should
not be requested by the developers. Furthermore, a number of
apps disclose sharing data with third parties, however, a small
number of these acquire the permission of the user before
sharing this data with the third parties. As track and trace
apps are voluntary and rely on the public’s trust to achieve
their function effectively [8], addressing concerns with regards
to data collection and sharing are paramount to their success
to combat COVID-19.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
provides a discussion on privacy and permission analysis of
mobile apps and work performed towards the development of
track and trace apps. Section III defines the background on the
trace and track smart applications. The section also provides
the working mechanism and important features of developed
apps. Section IV critically analyses the security and privacy
of different apps. Section V provides recommendations for
design chose secure development and concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
A large number of works have been presented that analyse
the functionality of smartphone apps and the leakage of the
sensitive information of their users [9]–[11]. Many contact
tracing applications involve tracing users using GPS, Blue-
tooth, and wireless technologies [12]–[17]. These approaches
usually provide users with two options. Either the user has
to self-report themselves, or the application takes the help
of a wireless technology [18]. A large number of people
are currently downloading and using contact-tracing apps,
and hence the privacy aspects of these apps have become
paramount for the research and development of unanimous
privacy regulation. The regulators such as the Federal Trade
Commission, the US National Telecommunication and infor-
mation administrations, the European Union Commission [19],
[20], Information Commissioner’s Office [21] are analyzing
and providing these guidelines to the app developers, content
creators, website operators to improve the development of their
products in terms of security and privacy. In this section,
we summarize works related to the security and privacy of
smartphone apps.
Smartphone apps normally get access to user data and other
information through the use of permission [22] that the users
provide to the smartphone app at the time of app installation.
For example, an app might ask to grant the to see the location
of the user, the messages stored on the mobile phone, the
search history, etc. The user can still control the permission
after the installation but it might affect the functionality
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of apps operations. Providing permission to various private
information would expose the private information of users to
the advertisers, insurance companies [23], [24], and publicly
expose personal data of the users without the user’s consent
[25], [26]. A large number of smartphones app also ask unnec-
essary permission that is not required for the functionality of
the app, these apps might pose a serious threat to privacy and
security of the users [27], [28]. Muhammad et al. [29], [30]
analyzed the security and privacy of smartphone apps designed
for blocking the advertisement and providing mobile VPN
clients. Ilaria et al. [31] analyzed the permissions requested
by the smartphone apps and assigned a sensitivity score to
the app if the app asked to read the personal information of
the users. They concluded that around 56% of the app asks
users to provide permission to sensitive parts of the user’s
data. Barrera et al. [32] investigated the relationship between
free android apps and the most popular 1100 Android apps by
deploying machine learning methods. It is also concluded that
people are willing to use the paid version of smartphone apps
if apps are not asking for unnecessary permissions. Enck et al.
[33] proposed a lightweight certification mechanism to identify
Android apps that are asking for suspicious permissions. Pern
et al. [34] studied the user-consent permission systems by
using the user-centric data from the Facebook apps, chrome
browser extensions, and Android smartphone apps. It is very
important to develop tools or applications that inform users
about the privacy indicator of the apps they are using for spe-
cific purposes. To address this issue, Max et al. [35] developed
a prototype that provides users with privacy indicators of the
app. The prototype also identifies previously exposed hidden
information flows out of the apps.
Contact tracing with smartphones can be employed to
restrict the transmission of a pandemic disease. Utilizing com-
puting technologies to avert and control the pandemic seems
to be an obvious choice. However, these contact tracing apps
might invade privacy, collect personal data, and justify mass
surveillance against users’ wishes. There must be a protocol
for contact tracing that observes commitment to privacy, as
well as provides the consent mechanism where there is a need
to share individual data. Contact tracing may collect personal
data such as location which is not an effective privacy control
when it comes to user’s data [36]. The process of contact
tracing usually involves collecting users’ privacy information
without informing them. Privacy-literate individuals might be
reluctant to share their information which in turn hampers
the process of contact tracing. Privacy-preserving approaches
might encourage individuals to participate more in this process
and increase their confidence in those applications [18].
Prominent privacy researchers from across the world are
arguing with the government agencies and vendors involved
in developing the contact-tracing application about the privacy,
and also highlighted the catastrophic consequences these apps
would have on the citizen’s private lives [37], [38]. To ensure
privacy, Berke et al. [39] utilized the semantics of private set
interaction for assessing the risk exposure of users using en-
crypted and anonymous GPS locations. Manish et al. [40] an-
alyzed the privacy preservation mechanism for various contact
tracing applications and discussed the attributes which contact-
tracing apps should have to ensure the privacy of users.Michael
et al [41] discussed the ethical consideration of contact-tracing
apps for fighting against the COVID-19. Several contact-
tracing application has been compared in [42] in terms of data
collection, retention of data, purpose, and sharing of collected
data, what mechanisms the apps have deployed to ensure the
privacy of users. Most recently, Carmela et al. [4] describe
and analyse a decentralized system for secure and privacy-
preserving proximity tracing to combat the spread of COVID-
19. The system is solely based on the anonymous identifiers
of positive users of the COVID-19 without providing the
exact location information to the health authorities. Serge
[43] analyse the security and privacy properties of the pan-
European Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing
(DP3T) system. Health authorities or any other users would
not be able to learn the private information of the users except
a notification message when a person is exposed to COVID-
19 affected person.Ruoxi et al. [44] analyze the security
and privacy of contact tracing apps in three dimensions: a)
evaluate the design choice (centralized or decentralized) used
for privacy preservation, b) static analysis for the identifi-
cation of potential vulnerabilities and c) (iii) evaluate the
robustness of approaches used for privacy-preservation. The
paper has not analyzed the permission analysis. Yaron et al.
[45] analysed the security and privacy properties of Bluetooth
based specification by Apple and Google, concluding that
the specifications may have some significant security and
privacy risks. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDS) have issued guidelines that define a set of features a
contact tracing app should have to help health departments to
overcome the COVID-19 pandemic [46].
III. CHARACTERIZING CONTACT TRACING APPS
Contact tracing is an important tool for the community
to prevent the outspread of novel pandemic diseases, such
as COVID-19 [47]. In past contact-tracing tools have shown
effectiveness against the spread of transmissible diseases such
as STD, HIV, Ebola, and tuberculosis [48], [49]. Contact
tracing is the process of identifying persons who are in
close contact with the infected person so that exposed targets
can be informed to have self-isolation and quarantine, thus
breaking the chain of transmission [36]. The current outbreak
of COVID-19 and its highly contagious feature motivates
technology developers to develop smartphone apps for the
effective tracing of the footprint of the disease. In this section,
we provide the architectural setup of contact-tracing apps and
their significance towards controlling the spread of disease.
A. Centralized and Decentralized Architecture
The design of contact-tracing apps is mainly using data from
the users thus has some privacy concerns which motivate the
developer to come up with privacy-preserving solutions. The
privacy of users can be addressed using the centralized and
decentralized system setup. The centralized and decentralized
apps entirely have different architecture and properties shown
in Figure 2 and explained below.
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Fig. 2: Architectural Setup of Contact Tracing Apps
1) Centralised models: In the centralized setup, the smart-
phones of the users having specific contact-tracing apps send
the random identifier to the centralized trusted system. The
centralized system in this setup holds the information from all
users of the app. If a person has tested positive for the COVID-
19 virus, the identifier of other users who have exchanged
identifiers in the past can be sent to the centralized server
along with other information e.g. time data is sent, a time when
identifiers are exchanged, etc. The centralized system decrypts
the identifiers and automatically notifies the interacted phones
suggesting or informing users to self-isolate or take other
preventive measures. The centralized system can also utilize
the available information for further analysis and policies for
placing lockdown in hard-hit proximities.
2) Decentralised models: In the decentralized setup there
is not a trusted centralized system that exists for the handling
of the user’s data and matching of smartphone’s identifier. If a
person is diagnosed positive with the COVID-19, the identifier
of his phone and test result is uploaded to the centralized
system. Other smartphones having the app can access these
reports and locally establish the truth whether he was close to
an infected individual or not. If a smartphone comes across
the identity that has COVID-19 then alert is the sent to the
user of the smartphone for precaution and self-isolation. The
location and proximity of the person are not known to the
centralized system thus ensuring the privacy of the users using
the app. The health organizations or the government still used
the shared data to understand the spread of the virus in the
community but would not have detailed information about the
users.
B. Significance of Contact Tracing for COVID-19
Since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in December
2019, as of June 2020, there exists no medicine or vaccine
to fight against the rapidly spreading pandemic. Governments
across the world are currently focusing on the ways that would
have the least load on their health systems. This has been
achieved through imposing travel restrictions or lockdown
however, it is not only affecting the economy but there are
also fears of the second wave of infection once the restrictions
are relaxed. The governments are finding ways to identify the
methods for contact tracing in order to quickly identify and
isolate the infected persons. The manual contact tracing is not
only slow and has a late response, but would also require
resources for identifying infected persons and then asking for
his contacts and then contacts of his contacts to track the flow
of the disease. The technologies soon realized the importance
of smartphones and used the inbuilt smartphone sensors for
tracking in an automated and efficient way. The use of digital
technologies help the citizen at the early stage of the virus
spread and inform people for isolation at the early stage.
The use of smartphone apps for contact tracing has shown
promising results in several countries to combat the spread of
the virus [50], however, the performance efficiency depends
on the number of people using the application [51]. One thing
that limits the usage of the app is the privacy because a large
number of existing apps store data at the central trusted system,
and in some circumstance, this data is made available to the
third party systems for performing artificial Intelligence and
data analysis.
C. Vendor Support
As the healthcare officers and medical entities are working
together worldwide to fight the spread of this pandemic,
Google and Apple have joined an effort and developed a
privacy-preserving contact tracing API that uses Bluetooth
signals [52] for exchanging information between people who
are in close contact with each other. The apps using this
API operate in a decentralized fashion, however, a centralized
database is maintained. This framework allows healthcare
agencies to propose or develop smartphone apps that help in
limiting the spread of the disease with the help of Bluetooth
technology. This API will bring interoperability between iOS
and Android devices while maintaining privacy, consent, and
transparency [53]. A test project, PACT (Private Automated
Contact Tracing), was built at MIT to harness the strength of
Bluetooth-based, privacy-preserving, automated contact trac-
ing API. This project detects proximity between contacts
with the help of Bluetooth signals within a 6-foot radius.
Instead of relying on the GPS, this system sends out random
Bluetooth numbers, which can later be updated to a database
with the user’s consent [54]. The first large-scale pilot for
this joint venture has been launched in Switzerland, known as
SwissCovid. This application determines the close contact that
lasted for more than 15 minutes and notifies the user with the
procedure to follow [55].
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Apple also released a new application for COVID-19 based
on CDC guidelines that provide COVID-19 information across
the USA. In this application, the users have to answer some
questions related to recent exposure and risk factors. In
return, they get a CDC recommendation on what their next
step should be. However, this application does not replace a
healthcare worker in any way [56], [57]. Another application,
”HEALTHLYNKED COVID-19 Tracker”, which became the
most downloaded coronavirus tracker application for March.
The application enables users to track local cases and chat
with other users around the world. The most unique feature
of this application is that it enables real-time chat with other
users and share updates [58], [59].
IV. ANALYSIS OF CONTACT TRACING APPS
In this section, we present our approach to studying current
contact tracing apps for COVID-19. We have focused on
smartphone apps for any platform (iOS, Android, Microsoft)
and available anywhere in the world. Although there appears
a concerted effort by governments across the globe to contain
the pandemic, we identified through our analysis that many
such apps have been developed by third-party individuals or
organizations. Therefore, we have also included these in our
analysis. Furthermore, as the contact tracing technology is still
in its early stages (especially within the context of COVID-19),
although many apps claim to perform track and trace function,
their effectiveness in this respect is subjective.
A. Data collection
In order to achieve an in-depth analysis of current track
& trace apps, we performed exhaustive search techniques
to collect relevant apps across two major platforms (iOS
and Android), irrespective of the country or the developing
organization (government and private). We have chosen iOS
and Android because these systems currently hold the most
market share in the smartphone industry. Specifically, we used
keywords such as COVID-19, COVID track & trace, and Coro-
navirus track & trace. We analyzed the results of our search
queries to filter apps that did not relate to contact tracing to
mitigate the spread of COVID-19. We used a manual analysis
of the app description to conduct this filtering. Furthermore,
as several countries have encountered difficulties to achieve
effective contact tracing, we did not exclude apps performing
the partial or limited function in this regard. Overall, we
identified 26 smartphone apps that claim to perform contact
tracing in their description belonging to 17 different countries.
Details of these apps are presented in table I with a brief
description of some apps presented below. Furthermore, Fig 3
presents a graphical representation of the timeline with respect
to launching dates of prominent apps.
• COVID-19 Gov PK is an app developed by the gov-
ernment of Pakistan. Initially, the application provided
awareness to citizens about COVID-19, however, with
the development of the new radius alert feature, this
application provides information which are hot-spot areas
that help country to impose smart lock-down [60].
• Health Canada is developed by the government of
Canada to provide a personalized recommendation to the
users based on their risk factors. Personal data collected
is only used by Health Canada and is not shared with any
other application or agency [61].
• The government of Vietnam has developed an application
named COVID-19 which includes features such as chat-
bot, consultation, and live updates on COVID-19. The
application requires access to media, location, storage,
device ID, and call logs. The application’s privacy poli-
cies are updated in its native language [62].
• COVID19 - DXB Smart App is developed by the gov-
ernment of Dubai and provides general information on
COVID-19 and also provides correct statistics. The appli-
cation collects personal information voluntarily but does
not share with the third-party applications unless required
by the law [63].
• COVI is a third-party COVID-19 informative app devel-
oped by Droobi, a Qatar based digital company. This
application collects personal data such as contact infor-
mation, age, health information, and unique identifiers,
etc. [64].
• Corona360 is an app developed in South Korea which
enables users to update their COVID-19 status as well as
view the status of other people. For privacy reasons, the
app does not collect any personal information such as ID,
name, or phone number [65].
• CoronaCheck is a third-party application that has been
developed to enable its users to conduct self-assessment
and provide accurate expert COVID-19 information to
the users. This application does not collect any personal
information and does not share data with third-party
vendors [66].
• The Beat COVID Gibraltar app is developed for the
region of Gibralter and it utilizes Bluetooth technology
in a decentralized way to track other phones who come
in close contact with the person declared himself as the
virus affected.
• BC COVID-19 Support is developed for the resident of
British Columbia, Canada, to inform the people about
the status of COVID-19 in British Columbia and guide
them on what next action people should take. All the
recommendations are personalized so it involves some
level of contact tracing.
• COVID Symptom Study has been designed for everyone to
report their health status to the people who are developing
policies to fight against the Virus.
• BeAware Bahrain is a mobile application developed for
the region of Bahrain that helps citizens to contain the
spread of the virus by using the contact tracing efforts.
• Tawakkalna (Covid-19 KSA) is the official app of king-
dom of Saudi Arabia. It helps in controlling the spread of
COVID-19 and suggest authorities where to impose the
curfew and lockdown.
Our study of these apps consisted of analyzing publicly
available information shared by the app developers and plat-
form i.e. privacy policy, permissions requested, and user
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Fig. 3: Timeline for release of COVID-19 track & trace apps
reviews. Furthermore, as some of the apps did not use SSL, we
performed black-box testing of the apps using the Burp suite
to analyze the network traffic during the app usage. The traffic
analysis did indeed help us identify the information collected
by these apps and shared with back-end servers which are
































































Distribution of apps and permissions requested
Fig. 4: Distribution of apps and requested permissions
B. Permission analysis
Permissions required by a smartphone app are significant as
they communicate with the user the resources required by the
app to perform its function. Therefore, presenting the user with
a list of permissions not only achieves transparency (providing
the user an insight into the app operation) but it also serves to
seek user consent. Within the context of our study, we have
gathered information about the permissions required by the
track and trace apps under study. Figure 4 presents a graphical
representation of the distribution of the apps with respect to
permissions required by them.
As presented in Figure 4, we expected the majority of the
apps to require access to location data of a device however our
study also identified permissions requested by the apps which
are not necessary to perform their function. For instance,
we identified 06 apps that require access to SMS and call
information of the device. In some scenarios access to phone
numbers can be envisioned however access to SMS within a
device is not essential to the function of a track and trace
app. Similarly, we identified 04 apps that require access to the
camera of the device which is of course an unexpected request
by a track and trace app.
Furthermore, 04 apps studied require access to the micro-
phone of the device whereas 05 apps require access to media
and storage of the device which are of course not critical
to the app’s function. Such apps are indeed causing concern
regarding the privacy of their users and exemplify a lack
of attention to the security and privacy of the users by app
developers.
C. Analysing privacy
To understand the privacy considerations applied for the
apps within our study, our analysis took into account the
privacy policy published by the application developer as well
as the use of basic privacy protection mechanisms such as
SSL/TLS to achieve encrypted data transmissions.
Through the study of privacy policies of the apps as well
as traffic analysis, we identified that most of the apps collect
personal data such as location information, name, and phone
number, etc. Although collecting such information is vital for
effective track & trace, appropriate mechanisms should be
applied to ensure secure sharing, processing, and storage of
such data. Such details were not available for most of the apps
analyzed in this study. Furthermore, an interesting observation
we made was the type of information gathered by the apps.
Specifically, our analysis identified that the track & trace app
developed by Dubai collects personal information such as date
of birth, name, email address, and caller ID. Such information
is not required for effective track and trace and risks privacy of
users as any malicious actor with access to such information
can easily perform ID theft attacks. We believe data collection
policies for such apps require immediate attention to minimize
risk to individual user privacy.
A significant challenge with respect to security and privacy
within smartphone apps is sharing data with third parties
to aid targeted advertisements. Smartphone apps using such
strategies leverage advanced analytics techniques to identify
user-behavior and profiles to achieve personalized advertise-
ments. Within this context, the information collected by track
& trace apps is highly personalised and if made accessible to
third-parties can lead to sophisticated advertisement techniques
breaching public trust and confidence in such apps. Our
analysis of the apps concluded that all apps are free to use
and do not include any in-app advertisements. However, some
apps (as highlighted in table I) do share data with third parties
without precise information about who these third parties,
what data is shared, and how this data will be used by the
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third parties. Therefore, focused efforts from the research
community are required to enhance data sharing, processing,
and storage practices within such scenarios.
Another aspect concerning the privacy of information col-
lected is how it is stored and shared by the apps. In this respect,
our analysis revealed that 10 of the apps shared data with
third parties however the nature and identity of such parties
are not identified in the privacy policies. This is a cause of
concern regarding individual privacy as the aims of sharing
this data are not clear and therefore users are not aware of how
their data may be used. For instance, a common apprehension
among users is the sharing of data with advertisement agencies
who may wish to use such data for targeted advertisement and
adware.
Having said this, we also identified examples of good
practice within our analysis. Specifically, some of the apps
clearly state requirements for user consent before sharing
data with third parties thereby assuring users with respect
to how their data is shared. For instance, Corona360 (the
app developed by the government of South Korea) collects
personal and sensitive data of users but whenever the data is
used, the user is notified for the reason of data usage.
In addition to the above, our analysis also uncovered
security vulnerabilities within some apps. In particular, we
identified five apps that were not using SSL/TLS to ensure
secure communication made through the app. Pursuing this
direction of analysis, we conducted traffic monitoring of such
apps and identified serious flaws in the app developed by
the government of Pakistan. Details of these vulnerabilities
have been reported to the relevant authorities however such
vulnerabilities do put user privacy at risk especially where the
app is collecting and utilizing personal user data.
D. App review analysis
In addition to the permissions requested, privacy policy,
and traffic analysis of the worldwide COVID-19 track and
trace apps, we have also studied user comments available in
Google Play and App Store reviewing these apps. Although
the majority of these comments are related to the usability
and general function of the app, we found some comments to
be insightful with respect to how the app collects and utilizes
data. For instance, the app developed by the government of
Israel was commented by a user to ask for users’ permission
when sharing data with third parties as well as to guarantee
not to send the data anywhere but compare it locally on
user’s device against downloaded ”Corona paths”. Another
interesting observation was made for the Corona-Datenspende
app, where user comments suggest that one cannot use the app
without connecting to a fitness account and hence completely
breaking the point of anonymity. As suggested by the user,
connecting to the app via a fitness app such as Fitbit indeed
does indicate sharing personal user data across different apps
which is a risk to user privacy.
Through analysis of the user reviews of apps, we observed
that although some of the users have included concerns about
the privacy of information through their feedback, these are
relatively minor proportions of users. For instance, for the
COVID-19 Gov PK app, user review includes comments
highlighting a lack of encryption and concerns about data
traveling in plain-text. However, for apps such as Corona-
Datenspende which requires a user to connect to a fitness app
as a pre-requisite, there are no user comments with regards to
how data is captured, analyzed, stored and processed between
the third-party fitness app and the government app for CVOID-
19. These observations reflect a lack of awareness among users
with regards to measures to preserve the privacy of personal
data collected, stored, and analyzed by computing systems,
therefore, requiring efforts to raise awareness among users.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
As Coronavirus is a contagious disease that spreads through
close social interaction between humans, contact tracing is
vital for containing its spread. Mobile devices present an ideal
platform to introduce contact tracing software due to their
ease of use, widespread ownership, and personalized usage.
Therefore, several smartphone apps have been developed by
governments, international agencies, and other parties to miti-
gate the virus spread. However, there is an increasing concern
regarding the collection and use of data, and out-sourcing data
to third-party systems. In this paper, we analyzed a large set
of contact-tracing apps with respect to different security and
privacy metrics. Specifically, we analyzed contact-tracing apps
for permission analysis, privacy analysis, the security of the
apps, and reviews of the users. Our major findings are as
follows:
1) Although there have been significant technological ad-
vancements to aid COVID-19 response, contact tracing
apps require further enhancements to achieve desired
objectives in a privacy-aware manner.
2) A number of track & trace apps request permissions
which may not be required for the successful operation
of the app’s function. These include access to storage
media, camera, and microphone which might result in
in a breach of user’s privacy.
3) Several apps mention outsourcing data to third parties,
however, it is unclear who are these third parties, what
data is shared, and how it is processed by these parties.
4) Some apps (used in developing countries) have not
adopted appropriate security measures for the exchange
of the data to and from the user to the data centers.
5) Our analysis of the user reviews and the ratings for
contact-tracing apps suggested that a large number of
users are aware of privacy concerns of these apps.
Though digital technologies could play a prominent role in
addressing the current pandemic challenges and the contain-
ment of the spread of the virus. However, the effectiveness
and accuracy of these systems depend upon the working
architecture of applications and user participation. The user
participation could be improved if systems employed mecha-
nism that ensures the security and privacy of users. To ensure
the privacy, security, and secure development of contact tracing
apps, we recommend following design choices that should be
followed for the development of contact tracing apps:
1) In order to ensure the privacy and security of the
user data, the contact tracing systems have to consider
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the well established and state of the art encryption
systems for storing data, enable personalized access
control mechanisms and utilize secure communication
mechanisms for the exchange of data between the users
and the data center. Furthermore, developers should also
consider the semantics of secure software development,
strong authentication mechanism possibly two-factor au-
thentication to minimize the risk of misuse.
2) The contact-tracing apps should perform their operations
in a completely decentralized way. i.e. the system per-
forms the bulk of its operation at the user side.
3) The app’s privacy policy should be mentioned in a
way that a user could easily understand. The developer
should also adopt the mechanisms that they could easily
destroy user data once this pandemic is over.
4) The design system should not unnecessarily seek per-
missions for example access to videos, browsing history,
or the images.
5) The developers should consider the measures that assign
a unique pseudonymized identifier for the users which
must not be linked to the user’s real identity and could
not be used to learn the private information of users
through background knowledge.
6) To improve usability, the design should be simple and
should have a user interface for interaction and personal
tracking.
7) We also recommend developers and regulators to use the
identity verification (telephone number authentication)
or authentication system within their trace and track
system so the information could be exchanged through
the reliable voice call.
It is very important to incorporate the techniques that ensure
the privacy of citizens so that they can confidently participate
in limiting the spread of the disease. The apps should not serve
as the tool for mass surveillance tools so that people trust the
system without having any concerns about their privacy and
tracking of their private lives. As a part of our future work, we
are looking to conduct a user study using qualitative measures
focused on directly considering the feedback from users to
further understand the usability and security concerns of users.
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TABLE I: Analysis of Smartphone apps designed to limit spread of COVID-19.













Android Location (approximate and
precise), full network access,
prevent device from sleeping
Data to be shared with third party Pakistan 500,000+ No lack of encryption. Data might
be traveling in plaintext. Radius
alert is not accurate. Doesn’t










full network access, audio set-
tings, run at startup, prevent
the device from sleeping
Collects sensitive personal infor-
mation such as DOB, name, gen-
der, COVID-19 tests status, lo-
cation, details of any treatment,
email, phone number, IP ad-
dress. Shared with universities,
research centers, amazon web
















precise), full network access,
prevent the device from
sleeping
Personal information collected
for COVID-19 alerts and man-
agement, only used by Ministry
of Health
Canada 10,000+ Yes Doesn’t update on a regular basis
with current stats. No graph of












Wifi connection, full network
access, media/files, and stor-
age, run at startup, prevent the
device from sleeping
Requires name and email to cre-
ate an account used for com-
munications and the announce-




500,000+ No Language issue to some people.
Gives out a certificate for com-










Android This application requires no
special permissions to run
No information being shared Pakistan 50,000+ Yes Shares information related to
COVID-19 and SOPs that gov-








Android Location (approximate and
precise), receives data from
internet and full network
access
Information will be accessed
by Smart Asset Sindh Health,
shared with third party
Pakistan 1000+ No Data information being sent in
plaintext. No encryption or algo-
rithm is used for data protection.







Android Location (approximate and
precise), full network access,
prevent device from sleeping
Personal data is collected by
Health Canada only to support
COVID-19.
Canada 50,000+ Yes App doesn’t take into account
pre-existing conditions. Will be
much more effective if user can





Android Location, phone, media, stor-
age, camera, microphone, wifi,
device ID, call information,
download files without notifi-
cation, run at startup, prevent
the device from sleeping
May use personal information
with third party
Vietnam 100,000+ N/A App is only available for Veit-
namese and not available in
English. Very narrow coverage
overall. Provides basic informa-
tion. Only accessible in Veitnam
1 4.4 and
up
COVI Android Location, phone, wifi, device
ID, call information, pair with
Bluetooth devices, receive data
from Internet, run at startup,
prevent device from sleeping
Information such as DOB, name,
the account number is collected
and shared with trusted third par-
ties
Qatar 10,000+ N/A Only restricted for the people liv-







Android Microphone, camera, location,
storage, calendar, Wifi connec-
tion, media, receive data from
Internet, pair with Bluetooth
devices, full network access,
prevent device from sleeping,
change audio settings
Sends personal information such
as ID, name, DOB, email, geo-
graphical location to a third party
Dubai 1000+ N/A Only restricted for the people
living in Dubai. Some users re-
ported experiencing network er-





Android Location (approximate and
precise), receives data from
the internet, full network
access, prevent the device
from sleeping
Collects personal and sensitive
data of user but whenever the
data is being used, the user is
notified for the reason
South
Korea
10+ Yes Useful and multilingual solution





Full network access Will not share any information Pakistan 10,000+ Yes Gives detailed information re-
lated to COVID-19 protection,









precise), receives data from
internet and full network
access
Collects information but does not
use it without asking from the
user
Australia 500,000+ N/A App opens in the web browser
which is clunky, the infection
status is updated less often than
the press releases, and is out of
date later in the day.
1.4.5 6.0 and
up




Wifi, device ID, call
information, download files
without notification, run at
startup, prevent device from
sleeping
No specific information about




500,000+ N/A Requires personal details
such as photo, name, DOB,
NHS number. Requires








Android Location (approximate and
precise), receives data from
internet and full network
access
Cannot access its privacy policy India 50,000,000+ N/A Location, network and Bluetooth
visibility required. No proper
tracking, no radius alert, bugs,
doesn’t update cases. Takes a






Media, storage, receive data
from Internet, pair wth Blue-
tooth devices, full internet
access, prevent device from
sleeping
Mobile number and anonymous
ID are shared in a secure server
and not available to be shared
with Public
Singapore 500,000+ N/A Doesn’t alert you to infected
cases in your area. Drains battery







Device and app history, loca-
tion, Wifi connection, full net-
work access, prevent device
from sleeping, change network
connectivity
Cross-referencing location data
with the corona patients
Israel 1,000,000+ No Correlates overlaps only since
installation. Should extract
and use historical information.
Data processed locally when a












Location, phone, media, stor-
age, camera, microphone, wifi,
device ID, call information,
download files without notifi-
cation, run at startup, prevent
device from sleeping
Collected data may be shared
with third party
Poland 100,000+ N/A GPS location is invalid. Cannot









Full network access, receives
data from internet prevent de-
vice from sleeping
Collect personal data and share
with third party







Android view Wi-Fi connection,pair
with Bluetooth devices, full
network access
No personal data will be stored
or used
Gibraltar 10000+ N/A Developed only for Gibraltar,
easy to use
1.18 6 and up
EHTERAZ Android location data, phone access for
calls, Photos / Media / Files,
full network access
personal data will be stored or
used
Qatar 1,000,000+ n/A additional authentication
performed, some privacy
flaws are identified
9.02 6 and up
BeAware
Bahrain
Android require access to apps running,
read calendar information, re-
quire access to location, media
files, and storage, pair Blue-
tooth devices
personal data will be stored or
used
Bahrain 100,000+ N/A some privacy flaws are identified 0.2.1 4.4 and
up
Shlonik Android record audio, access to running
apps, require access to loca-
tion, media files, and storage,
pair Bluetooth devices, precise
location information, full net-
work access
Collects data and location infor-
mation




Android/iOS phone access, access to media
files and storage, pair Blue-
tooth devices
Data is provided by users manu-
ally




Android GPS Location, read the storage
data, take pictures and make
video, pair via Bluetooth de-
vice, full network access




1,000,000+ N/A helps in imposing curfew 1.7 6 and up
MySejahtera Android precise location (GPS and
network-based), call access,
media & storage access, cam-
era access, full network access
Data is provided by users manu-
ally
Malaysia 1000K+ N/A user also need to register through
their website
1.0.24 4 and up
